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**1969/07/22**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

SECRET/NO DIS

# Memorandum

REVENUE DIV. DATE 5/5/69

TO : EA - Mr. Green  
FROM : EA/ACA - Paul H. Kreisberg  
SUBJECT: Proposal to Bring ChiComs into SALT Negotiations

DATE: July 22, 1969  
7/22/69

1. We are rapidly moving into the period when Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will begin with the Soviets. I have the clear impression from Department officers concerned that the question of attempting to bring the ChiComs into these talks either (a) by a public indication of US willingness to have the Chinese take part in the negotiations or (b) by a private proposal to the Soviets early in the SALT negotiations has not apparently been seriously considered within the USG. Such brief thought as has been given to it has foundered on our reluctance to have the British and French involved in the talks, and upon concern over the complexity of the questions involved in merely bilateral talks with the Soviets.

2. A public statement that we would welcome ChiCom participation in SALT negotiations at the very beginning of the talks would probably not be desirable since it would appear disingenuous, would probably irritate and puzzle the Soviets and might lead to a postponement of SALT, and could probably not be coordinated bureaucratically in the next week or two.

3. A private approach to the Soviets after the talks have begun could serve (a) to defuse any Soviet insistence on French-British participation, (b) indicate to the Soviets that we did not see the talks as directed against the Chinese, (c) {

(d) enable us to make public our proposal at some appropriate subsequent point as a further public gesture toward Peking, (e) test Peking's actual interest in participating in such discussions with the great probability the Chinese would refuse but the possibility of a major change in ChiCom attitudes and negotiation stance being revealed should they accept.



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4. The principle argument for Peking's participation is that the Soviets and Chinese are the two major powers about whose use of nuclear weapons we and our allies are genuinely concerned. This argument could be presented to the British and French as justification for Chinese participation and their exclusion. In the last analysis, however, if Peking were willing to participate, might this not offer sufficient inducement to cause us to reconsider the question of UK and French involvement? If the Soviets refused ChiCom participation, we could in any event then continue bilaterally with the Soviets having lost nothing by our proposal and possibly gained potentially both vis-a-vis US-ChiCom future relations and in terms of public approbation within and outside the US in many quarters.

5. If Peking did participate, it could attempt to prevent any US-Soviet agreement by advancing totally unacceptable proposals for complete nuclear disarmament. This could result in a slow down or substantial delay in substantive US-Soviet negotiations but, again, could be rejected by the US-Soviets who could again renew their bilateral discussions without Peking.

6. It is also true that Peking's involvement would involve major revamping and reconsideration of the US negotiating position. But would not the possibility of conducting negotiations on this critical issue with the Chinese outweigh this disadvantage and be worth substantial effort at construction of new US positions?

7. Proposal: That you suggest to the President that this question be urgently considered and evaluated within the USG with a view to full exploration of the pros and cons and the conclusions presented to the National Security Council within the next month.